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Judge, Jury, and Executioner: SEC Administrative 
Law Judges Post-Dodd Frank 
I. INTRODUCTION
Representative Scott Garrett, Chairman of the Financial 
Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government-Sponsored Entities, 
recently stated, “[s]trong enforcement of the securities laws is an essential 
part of the SEC’s mission to protect investors and maintain a fair and 
efficient marketplace, but in recent years the agency has transformed into 
a veritable judge, jury, and executioner with its blatant overuse of their 
in-house courts.”1  Representative Garrett’s comments stem from the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), which significantly expanded the powers 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (the “SEC”) administrative 
law judges (“ALJs”).2  Specifically, Dodd-Frank extended SEC ALJs’ 
ability to levy civil penalties on non-registered individuals and entities, 
while simultaneously expanding the range of penalties available to ALJs 
in administrative hearings.3 
With this expansion of power, a variety of constitutional 
challenges over the role of SEC ALJs have arisen in federal courts.4  
1. Press Release, Representative Scott Garrett, House of Representatives, Garrett
Introduces Bill to Restore Due Process Rights for All Americans (Oct. 22, 2015), 
http://garrett.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/garrett-introduces-bill-to-restore-due-
process-rights-for-all-americans. 
2. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 929P, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-2(a), 80a-9(d)(1), 80b-3(i)(1) (2012) (expanding the
penalties available to SEC ALJs in administrative hearings); Dodd-Frank § 925, 15 U.S.C. §§
78o, 78o-4, 78q-1, 78u-3, 80b-3 (2012)  (extending SEC ALJ jurisdiction to unregistered
entities and persons).
3. See Dodd-Frank § 929P, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-2(a), 80a-9(d)(1), 80b-3(i)(1)
(2012) (expanding the penalties available to SEC ALJs in administrative hearings); Dodd-
Frank § 925, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78o-4, 78q-1, 78u-3, 80b-3 (2012)  (extending SEC ALJ 
jurisdiction to unregistered entities and persons). 
4. See e.g., Duka v. U.S. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106605
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2015) (order granting preliminary injunction); Hill v. SEC, 1:15-CV-
1801-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822 (N.D. Ga. June 8, 2015) (order granting 
preliminary injunction); Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 1:15-CV-0492-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 131792 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015) (order granting preliminary injunction). 
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While most industry interest has focused on violations of due process and 
equal protection,5 constitutional challenges to the appointment and 
removal process of SEC ALJs have recently gained more traction among 
federal judges.6  These challenges primarily focus on the disputed 
classification of SEC ALJs as “inferior officers” as opposed to mere 
employees under the Constitution.7  Currently, SEC ALJs are considered 
mere employees and are hired by the chief SEC ALJ.8  However, under 
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, if SEC ALJs are held to be 
“inferior officers,” then they would require appointment by the President, 
courts of law, or an SEC commissioner.9 
Likewise, the removal process for SEC ALJs would be 
constitutionally suspect if they are deemed to be “inferior officers.”10  The 
Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Morrison v. Olson and its 2010 
decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight 
Board revealed that extensive insulation from presidential removal may 
be unconstitutional if the President has insufficient control over executive 
branch policy-making and decisions.11  As the removal process of SEC 
ALJs is currently structured, three layers of insulation protect these ALJs 
5. See David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 95 TEX. L. REV., 35–49,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2651671## (forthcoming 2016) (arguing 
for the constitutionality of both SEC ALJs and the structure of administrative hearings). 
6. See e.g., Duka, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106605; Hill, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822;
Gray Fin. Grp., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131792. 
7. See Duka, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106605, at *3–4; Hill, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
74822, at *43; Gray Fin. Grp., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131792, at *34–35. 
8. See SEC’s Resp. to Order, Timbervest v. Securities and Exchange Commission, No.
3-15519, 2 (June 4, 2015) https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/3-15519-event-
139.pdf (responding to SEC Commission’s order for an affidavit and any supporting materials
“setting forth the manner in which administrative law judge (ALJ) Cameron Elliot and Chief
ALJ Brenda Murray were hired, including the method of selection and appointment”).
9. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. (vesting power of appointment of inferior officers
exclusively in the President, Courts of Law, or the Heads of Departments). 
10. See id. (vesting power of appointment of inferior officers in the President, Courts of
Law, or the Heads of Departments); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988) 
(stating that congressional limits on the removal power will be upheld as long as they do not 
“unduly trammel[] on executive authority” or “impermissibly burden[] the President’s power 
to control or supervise” independent officers.); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) (finding the “dual for-cause limitations on removal 
of Board members” unconstitutional under Article II). 
11. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–92 (stating that congressional limits on the removal
power will be upheld as long as they do not “unduly trammel[] on executive authority” or 
“impermissibly burden[] the President’s power to control or supervise” independent officers); 
see also Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 492 (finding the “dual for-cause limitations on removal 
of Board members” unconstitutional under Article II). 
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from presidential removal.12  As a result, the removal process may be 
unconstitutional due to insufficient presidential control over executive 
policy.13 
This Note examines the constitutional debate surrounding the 
appointment and removal of SEC ALJs in five parts.  Part II explores the 
possible avenues the SEC’s Division of Enforcement has in bringing an 
enforcement action and the SEC’s increasing trend toward bringing 
enforcement actions in front of ALJs post-Dodd Frank.14  Part III then 
argues that the appointment of SEC ALJs has been unconstitutional since 
the passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010 and addresses the SEC’s response to 
recent constitutional challenges.15  More specifically, Part III argues that 
the expanded role and powers of SEC ALJs post-Dodd-Frank have 
transformed these officials into inferior officers more similar to the 
Special Trial Judges (“STJs”) in federal tax court than their ALJ 
counterparts in other executive agencies.16  Therefore, it is argued that the 
current appointment of these inferior officers is unconstitutional and 
should instead be handled by constitutionally appropriate officials, not by 
the Chief ALJ.17  Part IV examines the constitutionality of the removal 
process for ALJs currently followed by the SEC.18  This Part reaches the 
conclusion that although SEC ALJs are insulated from removal by 
essentially three levels of protection, this process is most likely 
constitutional, as the President’s control over executive branch policy and 
function is not seriously threatened.19  Part V concludes by discussing the 
potential consequences of the SEC’s appointment process being held 
unconstitutional.20  If the process were held to be unconstitutional, it 
could potentially call into question hundreds of rulings and billions of 
dollars in penalties levied since 2010.21 
12. See Zaring, supra note 5, at 32.
13. See id.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See id.
20. See infra Part V.
21. See Alison Frankel, Why the SEC Can’t Easily Solve Appointments Clause Problem
with ALJs, REUTERS (June 17, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2015/06/17/why-the-sec-cant-easily-solve-appointments-clause-problem-with-aljs/
(discussing the SEC’s difficulty in resolving the constitutional disputes over the appointment
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II. THE PROCESS OF INITIATING AN SEC ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING,
THE RECENT TREND TOWARD ADMINISTRATIVE LAW HEARINGS, AND
RECENT CHALLENGES TO THIS TREND 
Before addressing the constitutional issues surrounding the 
appointment and removal of SEC ALJs, it is important to note the various 
options the SEC has in bringing an enforcement action and the increasing 
frequency with which it brings these enforcement actions before its 
ALJs.22  In determining the manner in which to bring an enforcement 
action, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement has two primary avenues: a 
federal district court proceeding or an administrative law hearing.23  If an 
action is brought as an administrative law hearing, the Division of 
Enforcement participates as a party and must prove the SEC’s case.24  
After a decision is rendered, either the defendant or the Division of 
Enforcement can appeal the decision to the five-person SEC 
Commission.25  Following the Commission’s decision, the defendant or 
the Division of Enforcement can appeal to the appropriate federal district 
court.26  Historically, congressional limitations on which proceedings 
could be brought in front of ALJs along with the SEC’s infrequent use of 
ALJs resulted in little discontent among defendants participating in 
administrative law proceedings.27  Yet, recent changes to legislation and 
SEC policy have significantly increased the use of ALJs and 
concomitantly magnified defendants’ discontent over their extensive 
of ALJs). 
22. See Peter D. Hardy et al., The Appointment of SEC Administrative Law Judges:
Constitutional Questions and Consequences for Enforcement Actions, BLOOMBERG BNA,
SEC. & REG. L. REP., 47 SRLR 1238 (June 22, 2015), 
http://www.postschell.com/site/files/post__schell__bloomberg_bna__sec_alj_constitutional
_questions__6_19_15.pdf (discussing the current constitutional challenges to SEC ALJs and 
the future of administrative proceedings). 
23. See 17 C.F.R. §202.5(b) (2015) (detailing the options the SEC has in instituting
enforcement proceedings). 
24. See Ryan Jones, The Fight Over Home Court: An Analysis of the SEC’s Increased
Use of Administrative Proceedings, 68 SMU L. REV. 508, 511 (Spring 2015) (arguing that 
recent challenges to the constitutionality of SEC administrative law proceedings are most 
likely valid and the SEC should revert to bringing enforcement actions in federal court). 
25. See generally Securities Act § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77i (2012); Exchange Act § 25(a)(1),
15 U.S.C. § 78(y) (2012); Investment Advisers Act § 213(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-13(a) (2012); 
Investment Company Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-42 (2012); Jones, supra note 24, at 511. 
26. Jones, supra note 24, at 511.
27. See id. at 520–21 (discussing how recent legislative enactments have led to increased
use of SEC ALJs and correspondingly increased discontent). 
2016] SEC ALJs POST DODD-FRANK 417 
use.28 
Prior to the passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010, the number of 
individuals subject to administrative law hearings was significantly fewer 
and the penalties sought in those hearings were significantly less than 
they are today.29  Before Dodd-Frank, the SEC could only seek monetary 
penalties—its main enforcement mechanism—in front of ALJs if the 
individual or entity was registered with the SEC.30  Congress limited SEC 
ALJs’ powers in this way because it worried that jurisdiction over non-
registered entities and individuals might encourage the SEC to 
increasingly bring enforcement actions in a venue that lacked Article III 
judge oversight.31  Instead, the SEC was forced to proceed in federal 
district court against non-registered entities and individuals.32  The 
passage of Dodd-Frank significantly expanded the types of cases that 
ALJs are permitted to hear and the penalties available to these judges.33 
Accordingly, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement increasingly 
turned to ALJs post-Dodd Frank because of the convenience, increased 
chance of success, and enhanced power of these judges.34  Prior to Dodd-
Frank, the SEC brought around 60% of its enforcement actions in front 
of ALJs.35  This percentage has jumped to over 80% of post-Dodd Frank 
enforcement actions.36  Not only has the Division of Enforcement 
routinely turned to administrative law hearings, but also, 
“[a]ccompanying this increase in the use of administrative proceedings 
28. See id. (highlighting increased industry discontent through constitutional challenge
and criticism arising from the increased use of ALJs); see also Hardy et al., supra note 22, at 
1–2 (discussing the recent trend toward using SEC ALJs and dissatisfaction toward this trend). 
29. See Jones, supra note 24, at 516 (detailing the expanded administrative power of the
SEC under Dodd-Frank, especially SEC’s expanded authority to pursue penalties against non-
regulated entities). 
30. See id. at 512 (detailing SEC rights to seek monetary penalties in administrative
hearings). 
31. Id.
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a) (2012) (requiring the SEC to seek monetary penalties
against non-registered entities and individuals in federal court). 
33. See Jones, supra note 24, at 516–17 (detailing increased cases and penalties year
over year since the passage of Dodd-Frank). 
34. See id. at 517–20 (discussing the different factors that have led the SEC to
increasingly resort to the use of administrative proceedings); see also Hardy et al., supra note 
22 (discussing the increased trend of SEC enforcement actions proceeding in front of ALJs). 
35. Sara Gilley et al., SEC Focus on Administrative Proceedings: Midyear Checkup,
LAW360 (May 27, 2015, 10:25 AM) http://www.law360.com/articles/659945/sec-focus-on-
administrative-proceedings-midyear-checkup. 
36. Id.
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has been a concomitant increase in the SEC’s success rate in enforcement 
actions, with the Commission winning 90% of its administrative 
proceedings and only 69% of its district court cases.”37  Unsurprisingly, 
defendants in SEC enforcement actions brought before ALJs have 
expressed growing discontent in recent years over the constitutionality of 
these proceedings.38  Lately, at least some of these arguments have gained 
traction.39 
In recent federal district court challenges to the constitutionality 
of SEC ALJs, courts have primarily responded in two ways.40  In one line 
of cases,41 federal district court judges have allowed immediate 
constitutional challenges to SEC ALJs, despite the presence of an 
ongoing SEC administrative proceeding.42  In the other, federal district 
courts have rejected these challenges, instead requiring the administrative 
proceeding to finish before a constitutional challenge can be brought.43  
The primary divide between these two lines of cases lies in their 
respective interpretations of the three-prong Thunder Basin test, which 
was developed to determine whether a constitutional claim should receive 
immediate district court review or whether the administrative proceeding 
must first come to completion.44 
37. Hardy et al., supra note 22, at 1.
38. See id. (detailing the increase in constitutional challenges to SEC administrative
proceedings). 
39. Id.
40. See Jones, supra note 24, at 520.
41. This note will focus primarily on the first line of cases and will only sparingly discuss
the latter. 
42. See e.g., Duka v. U.S. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106605, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2015) (order granting preliminary injunction); see also 
Hill v. SEC, 1:15-CV-1801-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822, at *54–55 (N.D. Ga. June 
8, 2015) (order granting preliminary injunction); see also Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 1:15-
CV-0492-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131792, at *1–2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015) (order
granting preliminary injunction).
43. See e.g., Jarkesy v. U.S. SEC, 48 F. Supp. 3d 32, 34 (D.D.C. 2014) (affirming the
SEC’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject jurisdiction because the administrative law 
proceeding must come to completion before a constitutional challenge can be heard); see also 
Chau v. U.S. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (affirming the SEC’s motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject jurisdiction because the administrative law proceeding must come 
to completion before a constitutional challenge can be heard); see also Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 
765, 767 (7th Cir. 2015) (affirming the SEC’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject jurisdiction 
because the administrative law proceeding must come to completion before a constitutional 
challenge can be heard). 
44. See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1994) (precluding
district court jurisdiction over a pre-enforcement challenge after considering three factors); 
see generally Duka, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106605 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
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According to the Thunder Basin test, constitutional claims will 
receive immediate review if: (1) “a finding of preclusion could foreclose 
all meaningful judicial review;” (2) the claims are “wholly collateral to 
[the] statute’s review provisions;” and (3) the claims are “outside the 
agency’s expertise.”45  In both lines of cases, much of the debate has 
focused on the first prong of the test.46  In requiring the administrative 
proceeding to come to completion first, those federal district courts have 
held that a finding of preclusion would not foreclose all meaningful 
judicial review because defendants are able to appeal any ALJ ruling to 
federal district court.47  Contrarily, other courts have allowed immediate 
review because “delayed judicial review here will cause an allegedly 
unconstitutional process to occur.”48  Strong policy considerations exist 
for allowing immediate review of the constitutional claims.49  By 
delaying review, even defendants who eventually prevail on the merits 
will likely incur substantial harm given that the defendants’ clients and 
business opportunities would most likely have vanished, leaving 
defendants little reason to continue with the challenge.50  Even for those 
who do not prevail on the merits, such a delay causes substantial harm in 
its failure to provide an adequate resolution of constitutional interests.  
Regardless of whether immediate judicial review is allowed, the 
constitutional concerns remain and must be addressed. 
III. THE APPOINTMENT OF SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
A. The appointment process and procedural powers of SEC ALJs
pre- and post-Dodd Frank
The central constitutional concern over the appointment of SEC 
12, 2015) (order granting preliminary injunction); Jarkesy, 48 F. Supp. 3d 32, 34 (D.D.C. 
2014) (affirming the SEC’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject jurisdiction because the 
administrative law proceeding must come to completion before a constitutional challenge can 
be heard). 
45. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 510 U.S. at 207, 212–13.
46. See Jones, supra note 24, at 520 (discussing the difficulty respondents have in
bringing a successful district court challenge to SEC ALJs under the Thunder Basin test). 
47. Bebo, 799 F.3d at 767.
48. Hill v. SEC, 1:15-CV-1801-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822, at *22 (N.D. Ga.
June 8, 2015) (order granting preliminary injunction). 
49. Jones, supra note 24, at 522.
50. Id.
420 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 20 
ALJs focuses on whether these officials are considered “inferior officers” 
or mere employees under the Appointments Clause of Article II of the 
United States Constitution.51  If SEC ALJs are mere employees, then they 
could continue to be hired through the process the SEC currently 
follows.52  Historically, ALJs across executive agencies have been 
considered mere employees and hired through a process outside the scope 
of the Appointments Clause.53  This classification rests on the duties that 
ALJs have traditionally been authorized to perform.54  For example, ALJs 
have typically been confined to “oversee[ing] adversarial proceedings, 
rul[ing] on evidentiary questions, regulat[ing] the course of the hearing, 
and mak[ing] decisions,” activities representing far less an exercise of 
power than inferior officers generally wield.55 
In contrast with the traditional classification of ALJs as mere 
employees, if SEC ALJs were deemed “inferior officers,” they would 
need to be constitutionally appointed pursuant to the Appointments 
Clause.56  The Appointments Clause states: 
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges 
of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United 
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise 
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but 
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President 
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments.57 
51. See Duka v. U.S. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106605, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2015) (asserting that the key success to Duka’s claims rest on whether
SEC ALJs are classified as inferior officers).
52. See SEC’s Resp. to Order, Timbervest v. Securities and Exchange Commission, No.
3-15519 (June 4, 2015) https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/3-15519-event-139.pdf
(responding to SEC Commission’s order for an affidavit and any supporting materials “setting
forth the manner in which administrative law judge (ALJ) Cameron Elliot and Chief ALJ
Brenda Murray were hired, including the method of selection and appointment”).
53. See Zaring, supra note 5, at 10–11 (discussing the traditional use of agency ALJs
and the broad powers they’ve been given). 
54. Id.
55. Id. at 11.
56. Duka, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106605 at *5-6.
57. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Thus, there are two classes of officers contemplated by the 
Appointment Clause: (1) principal officers, who are nominated by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and (2) inferior 
officers, who may be appointed by the President, Courts of Law, or Heads 
of the Departments.58  Any individual “exercising significant authority” 
under U.S. law is considered an “Officer of the United States” and must 
be appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause.59  The Appointments 
Clause also applies to all agency officers, “including those whose 
functions are ‘predominately quasi judicial and quasi legislative’ and 
regardless of whether the agency officers are ‘independent of the 
Executive in their day-to-day operations.’”60  The Supreme Court has 
broadly construed the definition of an inferior officer and has required a 
wide range of individuals to be appointed pursuant to the Appointments 
Clause.61  For example, “[the Supreme] Court has held that district-court 
clerks, thousands of clerks within the Treasury and Interior Departments, 
an assistant surgeon, a cadet-engineer, election monitors, federal 
marshals, military judges, Article I [Tax Court special trial] judges, and 
the general counsel for the Transportation Department are inferior 
officers.”62  The Supreme Court has continually recognized a broad range 
of individuals as “inferior officers” because the Appointments Clause 
“not only guards against [separation of powers] encroachment but also 
preserves another aspect of the Constitution’s structural integrity by 
preventing the diffusion of the appointment power.”63  Consequently, if 
SEC ALJs are found to “exercis[e][] significant authority pursuant to the 
laws of the United States,” then they would need to be appointed 
consistent with the Appointments Clause.64 
58. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (describing historical understanding
of the Appointments Clause). 
59. Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991) (holding that Tax
Court STJs were inferior officers under the Appointments Clause). 
60. Hill v. SEC, 1:15-CV-1801-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822, at *43–44 (N.D.
Ga. June 8, 2015) (discussing the officials required to be appointed pursuant to the 
Appointments Clause) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 133). 
61. See Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 812 (2013)
(citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 540 (2010) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (giving examples of the various individuals classified as “inferior 
officers”). 
62. Barnett, supra note 61, at 812.
63. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878.
64. Id. at 881.
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Prior to the passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010, SEC ALJs performed 
tasks “in an area sufficiently removed from the administration and 
enforcement of the public law” similar to that of other agency ALJs, so 
that they were not considered “inferior officers” subject to the 
Appointments Clause.65  They performed, and continue to perform, many 
quasi-judicial tasks including ruling on evidentiary questions, issuing 
subpoenas, and overseeing adversarial proceedings.66  More importantly, 
prior to Dodd-Frank they were largely limited to regulating and hearing 
proceedings involving entities regulated by the SEC.67 Thus, before 
Dodd-Frank, SEC ALJs did not exercise enough power or influence to 
classify them as “inferior officers” and require their constitutional 
appointment and, accordingly, were appointed in a manner consistent 
with their designation as mere employees.68  The process for their hiring 
followed a similar process to the one followed today: 
As do other agencies, the Commission hires its ALJs 
through this OPM process.69  When the Commission 
seeks to hire a new ALJ, Chief ALJ Murray obtains from 
OPM a list of eligible candidates; a selection is made 
from the top three candidates on that list.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 
3317, 3318; 5 C.F.R. §§ 332.402, 332.404, 930.204(a).  
Chief ALJ Murray and an interview committee then make 
a preliminary selection from among the available 
candidates.  Their recommendation is subject to final 
approval and processing by the Commission’s Office of 
65. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 139 (1976) (describing that individuals exercising
non-judicial and non-executive functions are not considered inferior officers under the 
Appointments Clause). 
66. Zaring, supra note 5, at 11.
67. See Jones, supra note 24, at 512 (noting that Congress intentionally left the power to
regulate unregistered individuals from previous legislation). 
68. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Resp. to Ct.’s Inquiry at 1, Duka v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n,
15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106605 (June 15, 2015) 
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2015/06/dukavsec-secanswtoberman.pdf 
(describing the manner in which SEC ALJs are currently appointed). 
69. “OPM (“The Office of Personnel Management”) is responsible for the successful
management of human capital, not only within our own organization, but also across every 
Federal agency.  We assist Federal agencies in hiring new employees, provide Federal 
investigative services for background checks, create training programs to develop tomorrow’s 
leaders — and much more.”  U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., OUR MISSION, ROLE & HISTORY 
https://www.opm.gov/about-us/our-mission-role-history/what-we-do/ (last visited Oct. 31, 
2015); See 5 U.S.C. § 3105; 5 C.F.R. § 930.201(f). 
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Human Resources . . . .  As for earlier hires, it is likely 
the Commission employed a similar, if not identical, 
hiring process.70 
SEC ALJs, alongside ALJs across all executive agencies, are 
appointed through a process not involving Presidential, Judicial, or 
Commission oversight, but instead appointed through the Office of 
Personnel Management.71  While this appointment process was sufficient 
for SEC ALJs prior to Dodd-Frank’s passage, it is now called into 
question by ALJs expanded judicial powers post-Dodd-Frank.72 
Dodd-Frank tremendously expanded the role and influence of 
SEC ALJs.73  While “the authority of ALJs to exercise broad discretion 
in the administration of their duties has been established by the Supreme 
Court,”74 the increased quasi-judicial role of SEC ALJs post-Dodd-Frank 
transformed the body into a group of “inferior officers” that should be 
constitutionally appointed.75  As the Supreme Court stated in Buckley v. 
Valeo: 
Congress may undoubtedly . . . provide such method of 
appointment to those “offices” as it chooses.  But 
Congress’ power under that Clause is inevitably 
bounded by the express language of Art.  II, s. 2, cl. 2, 
and unless the method it provides comports with the 
70. See SEC’s Resp. to Order, Timbervest v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, No. 3-15519 (June
4, 2015) https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/3-15519-event-139.pdf (responding to 
SEC Commission’s order for an affidavit and any supporting materials “setting forth the 
manner in which administrative law judge Cameron Elliot and Chief ALJ Brenda Murray 
were hired, including the method of selection and appointment”). 
71. Id.
72. See Frankel, supra note 21 (examining recent challenges to the ALJ appointment
process). 
73. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 929P, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-2(a), 80a-9(d)(1), 80b-3(i)(1) (2012) (expanding the
penalties available to SEC ALJs in administrative hearings); Dodd-Frank, § 925, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78o, 78o-4, 78q-1, 80b-3 (2012)  (extending SEC ALJ jurisdiction to unregistered entities
and persons).
74. Zaring, supra note 5, at 10.
75. See generally Duka v. U.S. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106605, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2015) (order granting preliminary injunction); Hill v. 
SEC, 1:15-CV-1801-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822, at *44–45 (N.D. Ga. June 8, 2015) 
(order granting preliminary injunction); Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. et al v. SEC, 1:15-CV-0492-
LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131792, at *44–46 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015) (order granting 
preliminary injunction). 
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latter, the holders of those offices will not be ‘Officers 
of the United States.’  They may, therefore, properly 
perform duties only . . . in an area sufficiently removed 
from the administration and enforcement of the public 
law as to permit their being performed by persons not 
‘Officers of the United States.’76 
In light of the expansion of SEC ALJs, both jurisdictional and 
disciplinary powers post-Dodd Frank, it can hardly be said that SEC ALJs 
perform their duties in an area sufficiently removed from the 
administration and enforcement of the public law.77  Prior to Dodd-Frank, 
SEC ALJs were limited to imposing civil penalties in enforcement actions 
involving registered entities and individuals.78  While SEC ALJs could 
hear proceedings involving non-regulated individuals prior to Dodd-
Frank, the penalties they could impose were limited to temporary and 
permanent cease-and-desist orders, which pale in comparison to the force 
of monetary penalties.79  Dodd-Frank granted SEC ALJs the authority to 
impose monetary penalties against any individual who “is violating, has 
violated, or is about to violate any provision of this [title] [15 USC §§ 77a 
et seq.], or any rule or regulation thereunder.”80  Thus, SEC ALJs’ 
authority grew from limited control over a very small group to expansive 
76. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138–39 (1976) (ruling that inferior officers must be
exclusively appointed by means of the Appointment Clause). 
77. See Dodd-Frank, § 929P, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-2(a),  80a-9(d)(1), 80b-3(i)(1)
(2012) (expanding the penalties available to SEC ALJs in administrative hearings); Dodd-
Frank, § 925, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78o-4, 78q-1, 80b-3 (2012)  (extending SEC ALJ jurisdiction 
to unregistered entities and persons). 
78. See Jones, supra note 25, at 516 (explaining increased power given to the SEC after
Dodd-Frank, especially in giving SEC authority to pursue penalties against “non-registered 
entities”).  SEC registration is required for most brokers and dealers.  U.S. SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM’N, GUIDE TO BROKER-DEALER REGISTRATION (Apr. 2008) 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm#II.  The SEC defines a broker as “any 
person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of 
others,” while a dealer is “any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities 
for his own account, through a broker or otherwise.”  Id.  In order to register, these individuals 
and entities must: file a Form BD, and the SEC subsequently must approve the individual or 
entity’s registration; the individual or entity must become a member of an Self-Regulatory 
Organization; must become a member of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation; must 
comply with all applicable state requirements; and its “associated persons” must satisfy all 
applicable qualification requirements.  Id.  For further information on individuals required to 
register and the registration process can be found at sec.gov.  Id. 
79. See Jones, supra note 24, at 512 (detailing the changes to SEC ALJs that resulted
from Dodd-Frank’s enactment). 
80. Dodd-Frank, § 929P, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(a) (2012).
2016] SEC ALJs POST DODD-FRANK 425 
control over any and all individuals, including foreign entities that engage 
in securities fraud.81  With the expansion of its jurisdiction, sanctions that 
may be delivered by ALJs including cease-and-desist orders, 
disbarments, and large civil penalties have become even more powerful 
as they can adversely affect a much larger group of people.82 
Furthermore, Dodd-Frank also brought significant increases in 
the SEC ALJs’ disciplinary power.83  In addition to imposing civil 
penalties on unregulated individuals, an order of disgorgement can also 
be added to any proceeding in which the SEC could impose a penalty.84 
The SEC defines disgorgement as “the repayment of illegally gained 
profits (or avoided losses) for distribution to harmed investors whenever 
feasible.”85  While maximum civil penalties for individuals and 
corporations remain relatively small,86 the addition of disgorgement can 
lead to enormous penalties.  For example, in 2014, the SEC collected 
nearly $1.4 billion in penalties.87  Yet during that same period, the SEC 
collected over double that amount, approximately $2.8 billion, in 
disgorgement of illegal profits.88  Further, Dodd-Frank gave the SEC 
more power “to impose secondary liability for employees aiding in their 
company’s illegal activity . . .  [and] more power to regulate foreign 
private accounting firms.”89  Thus, the considerable increase in power 
SEC ALJs have enjoyed post-Dodd-Frank, combined with the numerous 
quasi-judicial duties they perform, casts serious doubt on their 
designation as mere employees. 
81. See Zaring, supra note 5, at 17 (discussing SEC ALJs expanded jurisdiction over
non-registered entities); “[T]he fact that SEC ALJs now have the power to impose strong civil 
sanctions. . .on individuals whose engagement with the agency’s regulatory scheme is limited 
to their mere participation in the capital markets, raises the question about whether agency 
judges have been given the sort of judicial authority that belongs with Article III judges 
alone.”  Id. at 30, n.127. 
82. See id. at 30, n.127 (noting SEC ALJs increased powers post-Dodd Frank).
83. Dodd-Frank, § 929P, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-2(a), 80a-9(d)(1), 80b-3(i)(1) (2012)
(expanding the penalties available to SEC ALJs in administrative hearings); 
84. Id. at 15.
85. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2014, 66 n. 9,
http://www.sec.gov/about/secafr2014.shtml (defining disgorgement and other key terms). 
86. See The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-2(e) (1990) (providing the civil penalties SEC ALJs can enforce on violators). 
87. Zaring, supra note 5, at 16.
88. Id.
89. Jones, supra note 24, at 516.
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B. Comparison of SEC ALJs with Federal Tax Court’s Special
Trial Judges (“STJs”)
Rather than performing functions similar to other agencies’ ALJs, 
SEC ALJs perform almost identical functions to those of the federal Tax 
Court’s STJs and, as a result, should be appointed in the same manner.  
In the 1991 case Freytag v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court held that 
an STJ of the Tax Court was an “inferior officer” under the Appointments 
Clause.90  In arriving at its decision, the Supreme Court focused on 
characteristics that are strikingly similar to those of the SEC’s ALJs: 
The office of special trial judge is “established by Law,” Art.  II, 
§ 2, cl. 2, and the duties, salary, and means of appointment for that office
are specified by statute . . . .  These characteristics distinguish special 
trial judges from special masters, who are hired by Article III courts on a 
temporary, episodic basis, whose positionsare not established by law, 
and whose duties and functions are not delineated in a statute.  
Furthermore, special trial judges perform more than ministerial tasks.  
They take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of 
evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery 
orders.  In the course of carrying out these important functions, the 
special trial judges exercise significant discretion.91 
As a result of these duties, the Supreme Court ruled that Tax 
Court STJs were not mere employees, but instead were inferior officers 
that must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause.92 
SEC ALJs perform almost identical duties to those performed by 
the STJs in Freytag and, therefore, exercise significant discretion.  Like 
the Tax Court’s STJs, “the office of an SEC ALJ is established by law, 
and the ‘duties, salary, and means of appointment for that office are 
specified by statute.’”93  Additionally, ALJs are permanent employees 
and can only be removed for good cause similar to the removal process 
for STJs.94  While ALJs do not have final order authority because all 
90. Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991) (considering
whether Tax Court STJs were inferior officers under the Appointments Clause). 
91. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
92. Id. at 880–82.
93. Hill v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Com., No. 1:15–CV–1801–LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
74822, at *17 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82) (granting a preliminary 
injunction). 
94. Zaring, supra note 5, at 13.
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orders are subject to the SEC Commissions’, they can issue cease-and-
desist orders, impose large fines, and issue injunctions.95  These 
formidable powers can have lasting impacts on both individuals and the 
industry as a whole.96  As one scholar noted, “[t]he cease and desist, let 
alone the disbarment, power matters because it can be used for future 
injunctions of indeterminate length.  Refusing to permit a person the right 
to practice before the SEC [can] mean, for brokers, accountants, and 
others, that their careers are over.”97 
By increasingly utilizing ALJs to resolve disputes, the SEC 
places policy-making decisions in the hands of a non-appointed 
regulatory body, which allows ALJs to exercise “significant discretion” 
and hold large influence over the industry as a whole without the 
executive oversight generally required over such positions.98  Therefore, 
SEC ALJs’ newly-created and significantly expanded powers and 
authority should require their appointment pursuant to the Appointments 
Clause. 
C. The SEC’s position that ALJs are mere employees
In response to multiple challenges in federal court to the 
constitutionality of the appointment of its ALJs, the SEC has defended its 
process for hiring its ALJs by arguing that the ALJs are mere employees 
and not “inferior officers.”99  It argues that its ALJs are mere employees 
because SEC ALJs technically lack enforcement power and authority to 
act independently.100  While some courts have opined that SEC ALJs 
95. Id. at 9.
96. Id. at 15.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 17.
99. See e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Resp. to Ct.’s Inquiry at 1–3, Duka v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 15 Civ. 357(RMB)(SN)), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2015/06/dukavsec-secanswtoberman.pdf; SEC’s 
Resp. to Order, Timbervest, LLC v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2015 WL 7597428, (N.D. Ga. 
Aug. 4, 2015) (No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/3-
15519-event-139.pdf (responding to SEC Commission’s order for an affidavit and any 
supporting materials “setting forth the manner in which administrative law judge Cameron 
Elliot and Chief ALJ Brenda Murray were hired, including the method of selection and 
appointment”); Dep’t of Justice Supp. Briefing at 1–3,  Tilton v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2015 
WL 4006165, (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 15–CV–2472 (RA)), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/files/2015/06/tiltonvsec-seconwhyaljsnotinferiorofficers.pdf. 
100. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Resp. to Ct.’s Inquiry, supra note 99, at 2.
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closely resemble Tax Court STJs, the SEC has repeatedly stated that they 
are far less powerful: 
SEC ALJs powers pale in comparison [to Tax Court STJs].  For 
example, their power to punish contemptuous conduct is limited and does 
not include any ability to impose fines or imprisonment.  And while SEC 
ALJs may issue subpoenas, in cases of noncompliance, the agency would 
need to seek an order from a federal district court to compel compliance.  
Moreover, SEC ALJs are subject to the Commission’s plenary authority 
“over the course of [the] administrative proceeding . . . both before and 
after the issuance of the initial decision.”  They are also subordinate to 
the agency on “matters of policy and interpretation of law”.  In sum, their 
authority in no way approaches that of STJs, even if they perform some 
of the same basic duties.101 
According to the SEC, its ALJs are more comparable to 
employees of other agencies and, thus, are not powerful enough to be 
considered “inferior officers.”102 
While the SEC argues that the Commission’s final authority over 
any administrative proceeding prevents ALJs from being considered 
inferior officers, its arguments are ultimately unconvincing for two 
reasons.  First, the SEC and the D.C. Circuit Court have misinterpreted 
important precedent.103  Second, the expansion of ALJs’ other powers 
post-Dodd-Frank now requires them to be appointed pursuant to the 
Constitution.  In arguing that SEC ALJs are mere employees, the SEC 
has cited the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s 2000 decision 
in Landry v. FDIC, which considered whether Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”) ALJs were inferior officers under the 
Appointments Clause.104  In concluding that FDIC ALJs are not inferior 
officers, the D.C. Circuit’s majority opinion interpreted Freytag—despite 
express language to the contrary—as finding the absence of final decision 
power to be dispositive in determining whether an individual was an 
101. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Supp. Briefing, supra note 99, at 2 (internal citations omitted).
102. Id.; U.S. Dep’t of Justice Resp. to Ct.’s Inquiry, supra note 99, at 2.
103. Hill v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Com., No. 1:15–CV–1801–LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
74822, at *50 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“[T]his Court concludes that the Supreme Court in Freytag 
found that the STJs powers—which are nearly identical to the SEC ALJs here—were 
independently sufficient to find that STJs were inferior officers.). 
104. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (ruling that FDIC ALJs are not
inferior officers under the Appointments Clause). 
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inferior officer or not.105  The SEC agrees with the Landry court’s 
interpretation in arguing, “the Court’s discussion of the special trial 
judges’ power to render final decisions in certain cases ‘would have been 
quite unnecessary if the purely recommendatory powers were fatal in 
themselves.’”106 
Yet, contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s majority opinion and the 
SEC’s interpretation, the Freytag court did not place nearly as much 
emphasis on STJs’ final decision power.107  In fact, “[o]nly after it 
concluded STJs [of the tax court] were inferior officers did Freytag 
address the STJs’ ability to issue a final order; the STJs’ limited authority 
to issue final orders was only an additional reason, not the reason [for 
finding that STJs were inferior officers].”108  Rather than finding final 
decision power dispositive, the Court focused on the degree of authority 
STJs exercised in comparison with other employees.109  It found that the 
degree of authority exercised by STJs was “so ‘significant’ that it was 
inconsistent with the classifications of ‘lesser functionaries’ or 
employees’.”110  Contrary to the DC Circuit’s majority opinion in Landry, 
the Supreme Court in Freytag held that the lack of final authority power 
was not dispositive and that relying on such an argument “ignores the 
significance of the duties and discretion that special trial judges 
possess.”111  A reviewing court should instead focus on the extent of 
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative power the individual exercises.112  In 
accordance with this view, the concurrence in Landry recognized the 
majority’s faulty reasoning in holding that FDIC ALJs are not “inferior 
105. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133–34.
106. Defendant-Appellant’s Reply Brief at 32, Hill v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Com., 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 74822 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (No. 15-12831) (quoting Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 
1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). 
107. See Hill, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822, at *43–46 (“The Court finds that based upon
the Supreme Court’s holding in Freytag, SEC ALJs are inferior officers.”). 
108. Id. at *50.
109. See Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991)
(considering whether Tax Court STJs were inferior officers under the Appointments Clause). 
110. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881 (quoting Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
344, 352–53 (1931)). 
111. Id.
112. See id. at 881–82  (opining that the Court should focus on the true nature of the
individual’s responsibilities and duties, rather than final decision power); see also Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (“There can be little doubt that the role of the . . . 
administrative law judge . . . is functionally comparable to that of a judge.  His powers are 
often, if not generally, comparable to those of a trial judge . . . .”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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officers.”113  Concurring in part—only because he believed the plaintiff 
has suffered no prejudicial error—Circuit Judge Randolph directly 
rejected the majority’s characterization of FDIC ALJs as mere 
employees.114  Instead, Judge Randolph opined, “[t]here are no relevant 
differences between the ALJ in this case and the special trial judge in 
Freytag . . . .  The majority attempts to distinguish Freytag on two 
grounds.  Neither survives close attention.”115  Circuit Judge Randolph 
was consequently unconvinced by the majority’s argument that the de 
novo review process followed by the Commission and the ALJs lack of 
final decision power were sufficient to render FDIC ALJs mere 
employees.116  Further highlighting the disagreement with the DC 
Circuit’s analysis is the express statement of U.S. District Court Judge 
May of the Northern District of Georgia: “Freytag mandates a finding 
that the SEC ALJs exercise ‘significant authority’ and are thus inferior 
officers.”117 
IV. REMOVAL OF SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
A. Recent limitations by the Supreme Court on the President’s
ability to remove executive  officers at will.
From the founding of the United States, the power to remove 
inferior officers has been considered vital to the full and successful 
exercise of executive power.118  The President’s ability to remove 
executive officers at his discretion is primarily derived from two places 
within the Constitution.119  First, the Vesting Clause gives the President 
113. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1140–41 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
114. Id. at 1140–41.
115. Id. at 1141.
116. Id. at 1143.
117. Hill v. SEC, No. 1:15–CV–1801–LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822, at *50 (N.D.
Ga. June 8, 2015) (granting a preliminary injunction). 
118. “In light of the impossibility that one man should be able to perform all the great
business of the State, the Constitution provides for executive officers to assist the supreme 
Magistrate in discharging the duties of his trust.  Since 1789, the Constitution has been 
understood to empower the President to keep these officers accountable—by removing them 
from office, if necessary.”  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 483 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (finding the limitations on 
removal of Board members unconstitutional under article II). 
119. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (vesting the entire executive power in the President);
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (mandating that the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully 
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exclusive control over the executive branch in the President.120  It follows 
that individuals exercising executive power must be controllable and, 
ultimately, removable by the President so he can maintain full control 
over the executive branch.121  Second, the Take Care clause requires that 
the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”122  
Without full control over executive officers, the President cannot 
completely guide policy decisions or ensure that laws are properly 
enforced.123  As Chief Justice Taft argued in Myers v. U.S.: 
The power of removal is incident to the power of 
appointment . . . and when the grant of the executive 
power is enforced by the express mandate to take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed, it emphasizes the 
necessity for including within the executive power as 
conferred the exclusive power of removal.124 
While the removal power generally provides the President the 
ability to remove executive officials at will, it is not an unlimited 
power.125  Recent Supreme Court precedent has argued for a rather 
limited interpretation of the President’s power of removal.126  Primarily, 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Morrison v. Olson and Free Enterprise 
Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. strongly restrict the 
President’s ability to remove executive officers.127  In Morrison, the 
Court considered the constitutionality of congressional limits on 
executed”); see also Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 137–39 (1926) (arguing for an unlimited 
presidential removal power over certain subordinate executive officials from, among other 
sources, the Article II Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause). 
120. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (vesting the entire executive power in the President).
121. Myers, 272 U.S. at 137–39.
122. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
123. Myers, 272 U.S. at 121–22.
124. Id. at 122.
125. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988) (ruling that congressional limits
on removal would be determined by a functional test, instead of rigid criteria). 
126. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–92.  But see id. at 697–734 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing for unlimited presidential removal power). 
127. See id. at 691–92 (ruling that congressional limits on removal would be determined
by a functional test, instead of rigid criteria); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010) (finding the limitations on removal of Board 
members unconstitutional under article II). 
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presidential removal power.128  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stated that removal limits would be upheld as long as they did 
not “unduly trammel on executive authority” or “impermissibly burden 
the President’s power to control or supervise [independent officers].”129  
Instead of a formal set of rules, Chief Justice Rehnquist set forth a 
functional test: “[t]he analysis contained in our removal cases is designed 
not to define rigid categories . . . but to ensure that Congress does not 
interfere with the President’s exercise of the ‘executive power’ and his 
constitutionally appointed duty to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed’ under Article II.”130 
Similarly, in Free Enterprise, the Court also used a functional test 
to determine the constitutionality of Congressional removal 
restrictions.131  In determining whether restrictions on the removal of 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) members was 
constitutional, the Court focused on whether the removal restrictions 
were structured so as to impede the President’s constitutional duties by 
“depriv[ing] the President of adequate control over the Board.”132  
Furthermore, the Court specifically looked to determine whether “the 
President [may] be restricted in his ability to remove a principal officer, 
who is in turn restricted in his ability to remove an inferior officer, even 
though that inferior officer determines the policy and enforces the laws 
of the United States.”133  Ultimately, the Court held that the removal 
restrictions were unconstitutional because the PCAOB enjoyed expansive 
executive powers and promulgated rules and procedures for an entire 
industry.134 
Consequently, courts reviewing the constitutionality of removal 
restrictions on SEC ALJs courts must read Morrison and Free Enterprise 
together and apply the prevailing functional test espoused in those cases.  
Whether such a challenge will succeed turns on “whether the removal 
restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President’s ability 
to perform his constitutional duty.”135 
128. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–92.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 689–90.
131. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 535–36.
132. Id. at 508.
133. Id. at 483–84.
134. Id. at 492–508.
135. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691 (ruling that congressional limits on removal would be
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B. The constitutionality of the SEC’s multi-tiered structure for
removing SEC ALJs
While SEC ALJs enjoy multiple levels of tenure protection under 
the agency’s removal process, the restrictions on their removal are most 
likely constitutional.136  Similar to the removal process of PCAOB 
members in Free Enterprise, the removal process for SEC ALJs follows 
a multi-tiered structure that extensively insulates ALJs from removal.137 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York’s opinion 
in Duka v. SEC discussed this complicated process for removal: 
All ALJs, including SEC ALJs, are removable from 
employment by their respective agency heads (in this 
case, the Commission) but only for “good cause.”  Good 
cause must be “established and determined” by the Merit 
Systems Protections Board (“MSPB”), an independent 
federal agency which handles federal employee appeals 
of adverse employment actions.  The SEC 
Commissioners, in turn, “cannot themselves be removed 
by the President except [for] inefficiency, neglect of 
duty, or malfeasance of office.”138 
Thus, courts recognized two-layers of tenure protection for SEC 
ALJs: (1) they may only be removed for cause, and (2) their superiors are 
also only removable for cause.139 While clearly protected from removal 
by two barriers, SEC ALJs are debatably even further distanced from 
removal by a third barrier that is concerning.140  In addition to SEC ALJs 
and Commissioners, the members of the MSPB are also only removable 
for good cause.141  Therefore, SEC ALJs can only be removed for good 
cause by commissioners, who can only be removed for good cause by 
determined by a functional test, instead of rigid criteria). 
136. See e.g., Duka v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Com, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 106605, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2015) (order granting preliminary injunction). 
137. Zaring, supra note 5, at 32–33.
138. Duka v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487) ((denying plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction) 
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
139. Id. at 393–96.
140. Id. at 32.
141. Zaring, supra note 5, at 32.
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MSPB members who, in turn, can only be removed for good cause 
themselves.  In effect, this triple layer of protection from removal limits 
executive authority such that the President “has very little ability to enact 
his preferred security regulation policy.”142 
While multiple levels of protection separate SEC ALJs from 
removal by the President, the relatively narrow scope of their duties and 
powers cannot sufficiently impede Presidential control to generate a 
constitutional issue.  SEC ALJs do not exercise the broad executive 
powers that the PCAOB exercised, but, instead, act in a quasi-judicial 
role within the SEC.143  They exercise powers that are functionally 
equivalent to a judge and apply law to the particular facts.144  
Additionally, in Free Enterprise, the Court chose to specifically exclude 
executive agency ALJs from its holding.145  Interpreting Supreme Court 
precedent, U.S. District Court Judge Berman of the Southern District of 
New York concluded, “[t]he upshot is that congressional restrictions 
upon the President’s ability to remove quasi judicial agency adjudicators 
are unlikely to interfere with the President’s ability to perform his 
executive duties.”146  Consequently, although the layers of protection 
from removal that SEC ALJs enjoy appear to place substantial restrictions 
on the President’s ability to enforce his preferred securities law policy, 
between SEC ALJs’ quasi-judicial role and the Supreme Court’s 
functional evaluation of removal processes, the current removal process 
for SEC ALJs is unlikely to be found unconstitutional. 
V. CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS ON PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE SEC
ALJ RULINGS, AND HOW THE CONSTITUTIONAL FLAWS COULD BE FIXED
While the SEC’s current process for removing ALJs is likely 
constitutional, the process for their appointment is most likely 
unconstitutional under recent Supreme Court precedent.147  As Judge 
142. Id.
143. Duka, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 395 (“This Court finds no basis for concluding, as Duka
urges, that the statutory restrictions upon the removal of SEC ALJs are ‘so structured as to 
infringe the President’s constitutional authority.’”). 
144. Id.
145. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10
(2010). 
146. Duka, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 395.
147. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (ruling that congressional
limits on removal would be determined by a functional test, instead of rigid criteria); Free 
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May stated, “Congress may not ‘decide’ an ALJ is an employee, but then 
give him the powers of an inferior officer; that would defeat the 
separation-of-powers protections that Clause was enacted to protect.”148  
Prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank, SEC ALJs were sufficiently 
limited in the extent of their quasi-judicial powers so as not to violate the 
Appointments Clause.  Dodd-Frank’s considerable expansion of SEC 
ALJ powers has since transformed these employees into inferior officers 
required to be constitutionally appointed.  While Congress clearly wanted 
to expand SEC ALJs’ powers in order to help “promote the financial 
stability of the United States,”149 there are constitutional limits on 
Congress’ ability to alter executive powers and courts must prevent 
unconstitutional extension.150  “The Appointments Clause prevents 
Congress from dispensing power too freely; it limits the universe of 
eligible recipients of the power to appoint.”151  Dodd-Frank extended 
SEC ALJs powers beyond that of mere employees, and thus, courts 
should require their appointment pursuant to the Appointments Clause.  
Failure to do so will maintain a system where significant power is 
exercised in a manner contrary to the dictates of the Constitution. 
If courts ultimately side with defendants’ recent constitutional 
challenges to the appointment process of SEC ALJs, there will likely be 
a significant impact on current and future proceedings, but not on those 
proceedings already completed.152  Past proceedings will most likely be 
exempt from attacks on their validity due to the principle of finality, 
which states, “[o]nce a judgment has become final, i.e., the time to seek 
direct review has expired or a petition for certiorari has been denied, it 
typically cannot be attacked collaterally, absent extraordinary 
circumstances outweighing the presumption in favor of finality.”153  
Further, the fact that the decision-maker was unconstitutionally appointed 
is not strong enough to outweigh the presumption of finality.154  “The 
Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
148. Hill v. SEC, 1:15-CV-1801-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822, at *51 (N.D. Ga.
June 8, 2015) (order granting preliminary injunction). 
149. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (stating the intention of the enactment of Dodd-Frank).
150. Hill, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74822, at *51.
151. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991) (considering whether Tax Court
STJs were inferior officers under the Appointments Clause). 
152. Hardy et al., supra note 22, at 4–7.
153. Id. at 4.
154. See id. (arguing that individuals voluntarily submitting to past SEC ALJ proceedings
436 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 20 
Supreme Court has made clear that even when the adjudicator lacked the 
power to decide the case, once a judgment has become final, the defect 
cannot be raised collaterally.”155  Thus, parties who have already received 
a verdict from an enforcement proceeding in front of SEC ALJs would 
most likely not be able to bring suit.156 
While past proceedings would most likely not be affected, a 
finding of unconstitutionality could significantly impact the plethora of 
proceedings currently in front of SEC ALJs.157  If courts found the 
appointment process unconstitutional, parties to these proceedings could 
most likely have their administrative proceedings found void.158  
Supreme Court precedent strongly supports the voiding of judgments 
rendered by improperly appointed adjudicators.159  Most notably, in 1995 
in Ryder v. United States, multiple decisions handed down by the Coast 
Guard Court of Military Review were vacated by the Court because two 
of the court’s officers were appointed improperly under the 
Appointments Clause.160  Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stated, “one who makes a timely challenge to the constitutional 
validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case is 
entitled to a decision on the merits of the question and whatever relief 
may be appropriate if a violation indeed occurred.”161  In Ryder, the 
appropriate remedy was to remand the case to the original organization 
(Coast Guard Court of Military Review) to be reheard by a body 
appointed in a constitutionally valid manner.162  Likewise, in United 
States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit decision en banc was vacated because one of the judges 
was retired.163  Again, finding that the decision was made by a 
constitutionally invalid body, the Supreme Court remanded the case back 
will most likely not be able to challenge the finality of past decisions). 
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 4–6.
158. Id.
159. See generally Ryder v. U.S., 515 U.S. 177 (1995) (holding that decisions by the
Coast Guard Court of Military Review were invalid because two members were improperly 
appointed); U.S. v. Am.-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 691 (1960) (vacating a 2nd Circuit 
en banc decision because one of the sitting judges had retired). 
160. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 188.
161. Id. at 182–83.
162. Id. at 188.
163. Am.-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. at 691.
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to the Second Circuit to be heard by a constitutionally valid body.164  
Accordingly, if the Court were to find the appointment of SEC ALJs 
unconstitutional, the hundreds of proceedings currently under way would 
need to be remanded and brought either in federal court or in front of an 
SEC body appointed in a constitutionally valid manner.165 
In order to fix the constitutional flaw in the appointment process 
for its ALJs, the SEC could implement a relatively easy solution: re-
appoint the ALJs in a constitutionally valid manner.166  This process 
would involve a vote by the Commissioners to reappoint the ALJs, thus 
satisfying the Appointments Clause requirement that inferior officers be 
appointed by the President, Courts of Law, or Heads of Departments.167  
However, if the SEC chooses to enact this reappointment process prior to 
any Court decision on the matter, it could be tacitly giving substance to 
current constitutional challenges to its ALJs.168  Moreover, any alteration 
to the structure of SEC ALJs could sound the bell for constitutional 
challenges to ALJs across the federal government.169 
Presently, the SEC has only taken minor steps to appease recent 
outcries over administrative law proceedings.170  In September 2015, the 
SEC proposed amendments to its rules governing administrative 
proceedings.171  Most importantly, these amendments would: 
Adjust the timing of administrative proceedings, including [] 
extending the time before a hearing occurs in appropriate cases, [p]ermit 
parties to take depositions of witnesses as part of discovery, and [r]equire 
parties in administrative proceedings to submit filings and serve each 
other electronically, and to redact certain sensitive personal information 
from those filings.172 
While these amendments serve to address the due process claims 
164. Id.
165. Hardy et al., supra note 22, at 5.
166. Id.
167. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2 (vesting power of appointment of inferior officers
to the President, Courts of Law, or the Heads of Departments). 
168. Hardy et al., supra note 22, at 6.
169. Id.
170. See Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes to Amend Rules
Governing Administrative Proceedings (Sept. 24, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-209.html (proposing to amend the procedure of 
SEC administrative law proceedings by increasing procedural safeguards). 
171. Id.
172. Id.
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raised by defendants, they completely fail to address to the glaring 
constitutional flaw in the SEC ALJs appointment process.173 
In response to the SEC’s inaction, Representative Scott Garrett of 
the House Financial Services Committee recently introduced a bill to 
rectify many of the procedural defects in the SEC’s administrative law 
proceedings.174  If passed, the Due Process Restoration Act of 2015 would 
“permit private persons to compel the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to seek legal or equitable remedies in a civil action, instead 
of in an administrative proceeding.”175  In essence, parties to SEC 
administrative law proceedings would be able to force the SEC to bring 
an action in federal court, instead of in front of agency ALJs.176  This 
option to compel would ensure that parties to these actions enjoy 
constitutional protection of their procedural rights, while simultaneously 
allowing the SEC to continue to pursue expansive monetary penalties.177  
In the short term, absent any change to its appointment process through 
SEC or congressional action, the SEC should return to its historical venue 
for enforcing security regulations—federal court.  Not only will the 
formalities of federal court lead to more satisfied defendants, but the SEC 
will also maintain high success rates in proceedings and simultaneously 
gain public good will. 
GILES D. BEAL IV 
173. See id. (making no mention of the disputed constiutionality of the appointment
process). 
174. See Due Process Restoration Act of 2015, H.R. 3798, 114th Cong. (Sept. 22, 2015).
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